COL749: Difference between revisions
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| credits = 3 | | credits = 3 | ||
| credit_structure = 3-0-0 | | credit_structure = 3-0-0 | ||
| pre_requisites = COL202 (or MTL 180) & COL351 (or MTL342) | | pre_requisites = [[COL202]] (or MTL 180) & [[COL351]] (or [[MTL342]]) | ||
| overlaps = | | overlaps = | ||
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Latest revision as of 16:26, 14 April 2026
| COL749 | |
|---|---|
| Computational Social Choice | |
| Credits | 3 |
| Structure | 3-0-0 |
| Pre-requisites | COL202 (or MTL 180) & COL351 (or MTL342) |
| Overlaps | |
COL749 : Computational Social Choice
for UG Matchings: Deferred-acceptance algorithm and lattice structure; strategic manipulation, LP approach for fair (median) stable matchings: many-to-one matchings and rural hospitals theorem; housing markets and kidney exchange; popular matchings. Fair Division: Proportional and envy-free cake cutting; rent division via Sperner's lemma; fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores; Pareto optimality and Nash social welfare; fairness of randomised allocations. Voting: Voting rules and axioms; strategic manipulation, Gibbard- Satterthwaite theorem, computational barriers against manipulation; structured preferences. Modem paradigms: Multiwinner voting axioms and Thiele methods; rank aggregation via Kemeny rule, NP-hardness and approximation algorithms; distortion of voting rules; participatory budgeting; liquid democracy: apportionment methods and paradoxes.