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	<title>COL749 - Revision history</title>
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	<updated>2026-04-09T07:50:12Z</updated>
	<subtitle>Revision history for this page on the wiki</subtitle>
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		<id>https://wiki.devclub.in/index.php?title=COL749&amp;diff=585&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Prashantt492: Creating course page via bot</title>
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		<updated>2026-03-04T10:00:07Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Creating course page via bot&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox Course&lt;br /&gt;
| code = COL749&lt;br /&gt;
| name = Computational Social Choice&lt;br /&gt;
| credits = 3&lt;br /&gt;
| credit_structure = 3-0-0&lt;br /&gt;
| pre_requisites = COL202 (or MTL 180) &amp;amp; COL351 (or MTL342)&lt;br /&gt;
| overlaps = &lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== COL749 : Computational Social Choice ==&lt;br /&gt;
for UG Matchings:  Deferred-acceptance algorithm and lattice structure; strategic manipulation, LP approach for fair (median) stable matchings: many-to-one matchings and rural hospitals theorem; housing markets and kidney exchange; popular matchings. Fair Division: Proportional and envy-free cake cutting; rent division via Sperner&amp;#039;s lemma; fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores; Pareto optimality and Nash social welfare; fairness of randomised allocations. Voting: Voting rules and axioms; strategic manipulation, Gibbard- Satterthwaite theorem, computational barriers against manipulation; structured preferences. Modem paradigms: Multiwinner voting axioms and Thiele methods; rank aggregation via Kemeny rule, NP-hardness and approximation algorithms; distortion of voting rules; participatory budgeting; liquid democracy: apportionment methods and paradoxes.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Prashantt492</name></author>
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